2005 ford excursion trailer brake controller

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Adding Trailer Brake Controller to and Excursion

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I have an "01" Excursion and have not looked yet but I'm wondering if it has the auxilliary plug under the dash to plug in a trailer break controller into like my "96" did. If so, does anyone have a pin out wiring diagram for this connector? *KEEP ON STROKIN*  

Yea it is there but you will have to look with a flashlight because it is hidden behind a dash support (directly under the radio). You can see it though a hole that is stamped in the support. The truck came with a pigtail to hook into the controller you should try to get the pigtail from ford (F81B-14K122-BA) or from a trailer supply dealer. From the pigtail documentation: Brown wire is listed as illumination Dark Blue wire is listed as trailer brake feed (to trailer) Red is listed as trailer brake control feed (power to controller) White is ground Light Green is stop lamp feed to brake controller Now the sticker that came with the controller has two ford color codes listed, Ford and New Ford. We use the "Ford" listing so it may be the exact same as your 96. Let me know if you need anything else. mark  

Here is an easy way Scroll to the bottom of this page on the left http://www.brakecontroller.com/  

Absolutely if you can get the pigtail life would be much easier! Just make sure you solder all the connections. mark  

[ QUOTE ] Absolutely if you can get the pigtail life would be much easier! Just make sure you solder all the connections. mark [/ QUOTE ] Buy the controller from the above and that adapter plugs into the truck AND THE controller no solder required! Wish they had that when I got mine or they did and I did not see it but I think that the made for your truck wire is a new thing Bruce  

I see on that page that they have a controller that reads air brake pressure. Does anyone make an aftermarket product that reads the hydraulic brake pressure? I gather this is how ford's "tow control" unit works.  

Master brake makes the best but is expensive but worht it. It is called Brakesmart. comes color of dash and installs in about 30 minutes.  

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 7, 2024

Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 7, 2024, 7:15pm ET  

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on August 7. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 8 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces have made confirmed advances up to 10 kilometers into Russia's Kursk Oblast amid continued mechanized offensive operations on Russian territory on August 7.  Geolocated footage published on August 6 and 7 shows that Ukrainian armored vehicles have advanced to positions along the 38K-030 route about 10 kilometers from the international border.[1] The current confirmed extent and location of Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast indicate that Ukrainian forces have penetrated at least two Russian defensive lines and a stronghold.[2] A Russian insider source claimed that Ukrainian forces have seized 45 square kilometers of territory within Kursk Oblast since they launched the operation on August 6, and other Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces have captured 11 total settlements, including Nikolaevo-Daryino (1.5 kilometers north of the Sumy Oblast border), Darino (three kilometers north of the Sumy Oblast border), and Sverdlikovo (east of the Nikolaevo-Darino-Darino area), and are operating within Lyubimovka (eight kilometers north of the Sumy Oblast border).[3] Russian sources indicated that Ukrainian forces are trying to advance along the 38K-030 Sudzha-Korenovo highway, and a prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that by 1800 local time on August 7 Ukrainian forces had advanced both northwest and southeast along the highway and are now fighting on the outskirts of Korenovo (in the northwest direction) and Sudzha (in the southeast direction).[4] The Russian insider source and several other Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces fought for and seized the Sudzha checkpoint and the Sudzha gas distribution station (southwest of Sudzha along the 38K-004 highway, 500 meters from the Sumy-Kursk Oblast border).[5] Geolocated imagery posted on August 7 shows that Ukrainian forces captured over 40 Russian prisoners of war (POWs) at the Sudzha checkpoint, and  Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 's Russia service posted satellite imagery that shows heavy damage to buildings at the Sudzha checkpoint.[6] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 7 that an unspecified unit of the Chechyna-based 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) has deployed directly to the Sudzhenskyi Raion—generally consistent with some reports from Ukrainian and Russian sources that social media footage shows Chechen "Akhmat" units in the Sudzha area since over a week ago.[7] Chechen units reportedly suffered very heavy losses in Ukrainian attacks in the Korenovo Raion on August 7.[8]

The Kremlin's response to Ukrainian offensive activities in Kursk Oblast has so far been contradictory, as Russian officials are attempting to balance presenting the effort as a notable Ukrainian escalation with avoiding overstating its potential implications and risking domestic discontent.  Russian President Vladimir Putin met with members of the Russian government on August 7, accusing Ukrainian forces of a "large-scale provocation" in Kursk Oblast and instructing First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov and regional authorities to coordinate assistance in Kursk Oblast.[9] Putin also met with Defense Minister Andrey Belousov, Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu, Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Alexander Bortnikov, and Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov on August 7 about the Kursk Oblast attack.[10] Gerasimov portrayed the situation as largely under control, however, claiming that Ukrainian forces attacked with about 1,000 personnel and that Russian FSB and the Northern Grouping of Forces have stopped Ukraine's advance and inflicted significant casualties.[11] Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces will complete their operation when they have defeated Ukrainian forces and reached the Kursk Oblast-Ukraine border. Other Russian officials doubled down on these contradictory points, often seeking to strike a balance between the alarmism of a Ukrainian mechanized assault and penetration into Russian territory and the status quo reassurances that the Kremlin "has the situation under control." The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) notably edited a post on August 6 to remove claims that the attacking Ukrainian forces were just a sabotage and reconnaissance group and that the Ukrainian forces retreated, likely to avoid backlash from making demonstrably false claims about the scale and tactics of the ongoing Ukrainian penetration.[12] Kursk Oblast Acting Head Alexey Smirnov claimed that the situation is "under [Putin's] personal control" and stated that several thousand Kursk Oblast civilians have already evacuated the area.[13] Manturov instructed the Russian Ministry of Finance to allocate a first tranche of 1.8 billion rubles (about $20.9 million) to assist Kursk Oblast residents in resettling.[14] Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin announced that the Investigative Committee has opened an investigation into the Ukrainian "provocation."[15] The Kremlin likely seeks to balance its messaging against two contradictory objectives to both discredit Ukraine internationally for conducting this attack into Russian territory and avoid inciting domestic panic about the scale, impacts, and potential outcomes of the Ukrainian operation. The Kremlin risks, however, discrediting itself among certain communities by seemingly dismissing the significance of the attack by framing it only as a "provocation."

Select Russian milbloggers heavily criticized the Russian military command for not detecting preparations for or preventing Ukrainian offensive operations into Kursk Oblast.  Several Russian milbloggers complained that Russian forces should have prevented the Ukrainian offensive operations into Kursk Oblast as Russian forces knew that Ukrainian forces had been accumulating forces and means in the area for the past several months.[16] Some of the milbloggers complained that the Russian military command's inadequate reaction was due to a lack of concern about the Ukrainian accumulations, unrealistic confidence in Russian defenses in the border area, assumptions about Ukrainian forces' fatigue, or false reports about the situation.[17] A prominent Russian milblogger criticized Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov for not auditing the combat command system to remove ineffective commanders upon assuming his position as Minister of Defense and called for Russian authorities to punish incompetent commanders and liars.[18] The milblogger further claimed that Ukrainian offensive operations in Kursk Oblast prove that the Russian military command made "strategic miscalculations" and that nepotism in the Russian military is protecting ineffective military officials.[19] One Russian milblogger, who is often critical of the Russian military, notably applauded the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for editing its Telegram post to correct statements that were "overly optimistic" and blamed unspecified sources in the information space for spreading "excessively bravura" information about the situation.[20]

Ukrainian forces reportedly used a first-person view (FPV) drone to down a Russian Mi-28 helicopter over Kursk Oblast, indicating that Ukrainian forces continue to successfully adapt their drone capabilities.  Sources within Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian outlet  Suspilne  in an August 6 article that SBU special forces downed a Russian Mi-28 helicopter over Kursk Oblast "with the help of an FPV drone" for the first time.[21]  Suspilne  published footage from Ukrainian law enforcement agencies showing a Ukrainian FPV drone striking the rear propeller of the Mi-28 helicopter.[22] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged the Ukrainian FPV drone strike against the Russian Mi-28 but claimed that the helicopter managed to safely land without injuring its crew.[23] Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that Ukrainian forces also downed a Russian Ka-52 helicopter over the Kursk-Sumy Oblast border area on August 6, but did not specify the means that Ukrainian forces used to down it.[24] Russian sources recently debated if Ukraine used an FPV drone to down a Russian helicopter near Donetsk City in late July and published footage purportedly showing Ukrainian FPV drones unsuccessfully attempting to strike rotary wing aircraft mid-flight.[25] Ukrainian drone operators also appear to be improving their capabilities to interdict longer-range strike and reconnaissance Russian drones in mid-air using FPV drones.[26] A widespread Ukrainian capability to use relatively cheap and widely-available drones to interdict expensive Russian helicopters and reconnaissance and strike drones would likely allow Ukrainian forces to hinder the Russian military's short- and medium-range strike capabilities while conserving Ukraine's short- and medium-range air defense interceptors for more rare and significant Russian air targets. ISW has yet to observe Ukrainian forces using FPV drones to successfully strike Russian rotary wing aircraft or conventional reconnaissance drones regularly and throughout the theater, however. Russian and Ukrainian forces are engaged in a technological offense-defense race and Ukraine's ability to field technological innovations at scale ahead of Russian adaptations is crucial for Ukraine's ability to offset Russia's current materiel advantages.[27]

Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov assessed on August 7 that Russian offensive potential will culminate within one and a half to two months, generally consistent with ISW's assessment of Russia's current offensive capabilities.[28]  Budanov noted that the main Russian offensive "should end" in about two months, because it "has already dragged on." Budanov emphasized that Ukrainian troops will be proactive in the meantime and not simply let the Russian offensive run out of steam without doing anything, suggesting that Ukrainian forces will continue local tactical counterattacks in areas of the front where they deem such attacks to be the most promising. Budanov's statements are consistent with ISW's assessment that Russian forces are currently committing the breadth of their present materiel and manpower capabilities to pursuing offensive operations throughout the theater, particularly in Donetsk Oblast, and that Russian forces are unlikely to launch a new distinct offensive operation this summer due to mounting constraints to their capabilities.[29] Even as Russian forces continue to make tactically significant advances towards Pokrovsk, the rate of their gain is not indefinite, and Russian forces will likely struggle to sustain their offensive efforts as they come up against more built-up urban areas along the line of settlements directly east of Pokrovsk.[30] Russian forces are executing their summer offensive operation with mechanized assaults that often lead to high armored vehicle losses, and the Russian command's apparent willingness to accept these materiel losses on relatively small sectors of the front will eventually burden the Russian military in the long-term, pushing them closer to culmination.[31]

Head of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU), Danielle Bell, stated that Russia has tortured 95 percent of Ukrainian prisoners-of-war (POWs) in Russian detention.  Bell stated in an interview with Dutch TV channel  NOS  that Russian authorities torture Ukrainian POWs starting at their first interrogations and characterized the Russian practice of torturing Ukrainian POWs as "widespread and systematic."[32] Bell emphasized that the torture of Ukrainian POWs constitutes a war crime. The torture of a POW is a violation of Article 3 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.[33] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade reported on August 7 that Russian authorities tortured and "brutally" killed a Ukrainian POW who served in his brigade in a pre-trial detention center in Rostov Oblast.[34] Bell's statements and previous HRMMU reports on Russian violations of Ukrainian POWs' rights are consistent with ISW's longstanding assessments about Russia's systematic violations of international human rights and humanitarian law in occupied Ukraine and toward Ukrainian POWs.[35]

The Moldovan Central Electoral Commission (CEC) announced on August 7 that it would not register the pro-Kremlin Victory electoral bloc in the October 2024 Moldovan presidential election and referendum.  The Moldovan CEC stated on August 7 that it identified problems with the Victory bloc's registration documents on August 3 and requested that the bloc correct the errors by August 6, but that the bloc denied that there were any errors and ignored the CEC's request.[36] The Moldovan CEC announced on August 7 that it refused to register the Victory electoral bloc in the presidential election and referendum.[37] The Moldovan CEC stated that people on the "international restrictive lists" listed in a Moldovan 2016 law, including EU sanctions lists, cannot freely manage the bloc's funds, cannot ensure the rights and obligations of the bloc, and therefore cannot represent the bloc.[38] EU-sanctioned Moldovan opposition politician Ilan Shor heads the Victory bloc.[39] The CEC also cited its July 2023 decision regarding the registration of electoral blocs, which states that the name of an electoral bloc cannot be the same as a political party.[40] The Victory political party is a member of the Victory electoral bloc.[41] Moldovan outlet  NewsMaker  reported that six CEC members voted for the decision, one voted against, and two abstained.[42]

A Russian court sentenced Andrey Kurshin, administrator of the "Moscow Calling" Russian ultranationalist milblogger Telegram channel, to six and a half years in prison on August 7 for publishing "fake" information about the Russian military.[43]  Russian authorities arrested Kurshin on August 31, 2023 for allegedly spreading "fake" information about the Russian military.[44] Kurshin's arrest likely aimed to make an example of a hypercritical milblogger to encourage self-censorship among the wider ultranationalist milblogger community, and Kurshin's August 7 sentencing continues to make an example of him to discourage other information space voices from growing too critical of the Kremlin or Ministry of Defense (MoD).[45]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces have made confirmed advances up to 10 kilometers into Russia's Kursk Oblast amid continued mechanized offensive operations on Russian territory on August 7.
• The Kremlin's response to Ukrainian offensive activities in Kursk Oblast has so far been contradictory, as Russian officials are attempting to balance presenting the effort as a notable Ukrainian escalation with avoiding overstating its potential implications and risking domestic discontent.
• Select Russian milbloggers heavily criticized the Russian military command for not detecting preparations for or preventing Ukrainian offensive operations into Kursk Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly used a first-person view (FPV) drone to down a Russian Mi-28 helicopter over Kursk Oblast, indicating that Ukrainian forces continue to successfully adapt their drone capabilities.
• Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov assessed on August 7 that Russian offensive potential will culminate within one and a half to two months, generally consistent with ISW's assessment of Russia's current offensive capabilities.
• Head of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU), Danielle Bell, stated that Russia has tortured 95 percent of Ukrainian prisoners-of-war (POWs) in Russian detention.
• The Moldovan Central Electoral Commission (CEC) announced on August 7 that it would not register the pro-Kremlin Victory electoral bloc in the October 2024 Moldovan presidential election and referendum.
• A Russian court sentenced Andrey Kurshin, administrator of the "Moscow Calling" Russian ultranationalist milblogger Telegram channel, to six and a half years in prison on August 7 for publishing "fake" information about the Russian military.
• Ukrainian forces recently regained positions south of Chasiv Yar, and Russian forces advanced northeast of Siversk, southwest of Donetsk City, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
• Russian Army Combat Reserve (BARS) units continue recruitment efforts.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast   ( Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Limited positional engagements continued in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 7, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are deploying additional manpower and conducting counterattacks near Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City) and within Vovochansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are clearing buildings in the high-rise area of Vovchansk, and that Russian forces advanced 100 meters in the southern part of the settlement, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this reported advance.[47] Ukraine's Kharkiv Group of Forces reported that Russian forces are increasing the number of artillery rounds fired in the Vovchansk direction.[48] The Kharkiv Group of Forces also noted that Russian forces are using TOS-1A thermobaric artillery systems in this area.[49] The Ukrainian General Staff reported fighting near Lyptsi, Vovchansk, and Tykhe (just east of Vovchansk).[50] Elements of the Russian 4th Volunteer Assault Brigade and the "Storm" detachment of the 153rd Tank Regiment (both of the 47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District [MMD]) and the 138th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are all reportedly operating within Vovchansk.[51] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets noted that the main forces of Russia's Northern Group of Forces (GoF) are still currently deployed in Kharkiv Oblast, emphasizing that they have not yet deployed to respond to ongoing Ukrainian actions in Kursk Oblast.[52] Mashovets stated that these elements of the Northern GoF include both brigades of the 6th CAA (the 138th and 25th motorized rifle brigades), the majority of the 44th Army Corps (LMD), and the majority of the 11th Army Corps (LMD), as well as the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade, and 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]), totaling between 72,000 to 75,000 personnel.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast  (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on August 7, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Novoosynove, Kolisnykivka, and Hlushkivka; northwest of Kreminna near Nevske and Makiivka; west of Kreminna near Terny and Torske; and southwest of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area on August 6 and 7.[53]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast  (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction amid continued Russian ground attacks in the area on August 7. Geolocated footage published on August 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[54] Additional geolocated footage published on August 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Rozdolivka (south of Siversk).[55] Fighting continued northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka; east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka, Spirne, and Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Pereizne on August 6 and 7.[56]

Ukrainian forces recently retook limited positions near Chasiv Yar amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on August 7. Geolocated footage taken on an unspecified date and published on August 7 indicates that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced across the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal and regained some positions in the Stupky Holubovskyi 2 forest area south of Chasiv Yar, although likely not within the past day.[57] Fighting continued within Chasiv Yar's eastern Novyi and Zhovtnevyi Microraions; north of Chasiv Yar in the Orlovo forest area (just north of Zhovtnevyi Microraion); and east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske. [58]

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Toretsk direction on August 7 but did not make any confirmed advances. Several Russian sources reiterated claims that Russian forces advanced within Niu York (south of Toretsk), have nearly seized the entire settlement, and may encircle Ukrainian forces there, although ISW did not observe evidence of Russian advances in Niu York on August 7.[59] Fighting continued near Toretsk; southeast of Toretsk near Pivnichne; and south of Toretsk near Niu York and Panteleymonivka on August 6 and 7.[60] Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) reportedly continue operating near Niu York.[61]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced in the Pokrovsk direction on August 7, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to one kilometer near Zhelanne (southeast of Pokrovsk).[62] Russian forces attacked east of Pokrovsk near Novooleksandrivka, Vozdvyzhenka, Ivanivka, Kalynove; and southeast of Pokrovsk near, Vesele, Yasnobrodivka, Kalynove, Zhelanne, Novozhelanne, Skuchne, Mezhove, and Karlivka on August 6 and 7.[63] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on August 6 that Russian forces operating near Pokrovsk are using motorcycles to approach Ukrainian positions and then conduct infantry-led assaults in groups of five to 10 personnel - and sometimes up to 100 personnel - in order to avoid armored vehicle losses.[64] The spokesperson also stated that Russian forces are hiding among and under dead personnel on the battlefield to conceal their movements.

Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City amid continued Russian offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City. Geolocated footage published on August 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Kostyantynivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[65] Fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Paraskoviivka, Kostyantynivka, Vodyane, and Volodymyrivka on August 6 and 7.[66]

Geolocated footage published on August 7 shows that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area south of Velyka Novosilka.[67] Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces and Eastern Military District); 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]); and 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue to operate in this direction.[68]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis  (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Robotyne and Verbove (east of Robotyne) on August 6 and 7, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[69]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on August 7 but did not make any confirmed advances.[70] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) confirmed that Ukrainian GUR units conducted a raid against the Tendrivska Spit (the thin sand bar extended into the Black Sea in westernmost Kherson Oblast) on August 6 and published footage of Ukrainian boats landing on the spit's shores.[71] The GUR reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed Russian armored vehicles, an electronic warfare (EW) system, and Russian fortifications during the raid.

A local Crimean Telegram channel posted footage on August 6 that of a fire near Oktyabyrske Airfield in occupied Crimea reportedly following explosions in the areas.[72] ISW has not observed additional reporting of Ukrainian strikes in the area on August 6.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign  (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted an unsuccessful large-scale Shahed drone strike against mainly Ukrainian rear areas on the night of August 6 to 7. Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk stated that Russian forces launched 30 Shahed drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk and Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai, and that Ukrainian forces shot all 30 drones down over Kyiv, Khmelnytskyi, Vinnytsia, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Kharkiv and Cherkasy oblasts.[73] The Kyiv Oblast Administration noted that this was the third night in a row that Russian forces targeted Kyiv Oblast with drones.[74]

The Sumy Oblast Administration also reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed an unspecified type of Russian ballistic missile over Sumy Oblast on the night of August 7.[75]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts  (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian authorities continue to portray themselves as providing adequate and promised social support benefits to Russian soldiers who fought in Ukraine, as well as their relatives. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that it has paid 98 percent of promised lump sum payments to relatives of Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine and that the remaining two percent of cases are either in progress or undergoing verification.[76] The MoD also claimed that it has issued veteran certificates to over 50 percent of Russian volunteers and that another 13 percent of Russian veterans are completing their registrations.[77] Russian Deputy Defense Minister Anna Tsivileva stated that the MoD is developing regulations that will allow Russian soldiers who fought in Ukraine to go to sanitoriums for rehabilitation with their family members.[78]

Russian Army Combat Reserve (BARS) units continue recruitment efforts. A Russian milblogger published a recruitment advertisement on August 7 and claimed that roughly 30 BARS units are fighting in Ukraine, promising monthly salaries of about 229,000-279,000 rubles (about $2,670-3,253) for unit commanders, and advertising high lump sum payouts for the destruction of Ukrainian military equipment, including Western-provided vehicles and weapons.[79]

Russian Technological Adaptations  (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

The Russian MoD claimed on August 7 that it has delivered over 700 robotic systems, including wheeled and tracked remote-controlled vehicles, to Russian forces in Ukraine since the start of 2024.[80] The MoD plans to deliver an additional 2,500 robotic systems to Russian forces by the end of 2024.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts  (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas  (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine today.

Russian government and military officials promoted narratives about Ukrainian offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on August 7 aimed discrediting Ukrainian leadership.[81]

Significant activity in Belarus  (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

The Belarusian and Iranian military continue to strengthen their cooperation. Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense Commander Major General Andrei Lukyanovich met with Iranian Army Commander Major General Abdul Rahim Mousavi and Iranian Air Force Commander Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi in Tehran on August 7 to discuss deepening Belarusian-Iranian military relations.[82] Belarus and Iran have pursued increased economic, military, and technical cooperation recently, and Russia likely benefits from these relations.[83]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/9403; https://t.me/EjShahidenko/3117; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6277?single; https://t.me/epoddubny/20648; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6272?single; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/1924

[2] https://x.com/emilkastehelmi/status/1821262611465564283

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[4] https://t.me/rybar/62535

[5] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58010 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/49685; https://t.me/vchkogpu/49687; https://t.me/dva_majors/49033

[6] https://t.me/radiosvoboda/66164?single; https://t.me/rybar/62502 ; https://t.me/astrapress/61325; https://t.me/vchkogpu/49693; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1821206406525043022; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1821205088377172112; https://t.me/officer_alex33/3419; https://t.me/marmuletik/26492; https://t.me/marmuletik/26493; https://x.com/Danspiun/status/1821249074709901562; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1821204696163373424;

[7] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2097 ;https://t.me/ButusovPlus/12447; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/12455

[8] https://t.me/vchkogpu/49666

[9] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74717

[10] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74718

[11] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74718

[12] https://t.me/mod_russia/41862; https://t.me/dva_majors/48981; https://t.me/belozori/6856; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/08/06/minoborony-rf-zayavilo-ob-otstuplenii-ukrainskogo-otryada-kotoryy-vel-boy-na-granitse-kurskoy-oblasti

[13] https://t.me/tass_agency/264864 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/264865; https://t.me/tass_agency/264868; https://t.me/rian_ru/256346 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/84802

[14] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/07/08/2024/66b36f6f9a79477da4e0baa9

[15] https://ria dot ru/20240806/delo-1964506616.html

[16] https://t.me/dva_majors/48975; https://t.me/Alekhin_Telega/11131 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18556; https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/18232 ; https://t.me/rybar/62528; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/16798 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/49042

[17] https://t.me/dva_majors/48975; https://t.me/Alekhin_Telega/11131; https://t.me/dva_majors/49042 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/49019; https://t.me/frontbird/12050; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/16798

[18] https://t.me/rybar/62528

[19] https://t.me/rybar/62530

[20] https://t.me/dva_majors/48981

[21] https://suspilne dot media/808225-sbu-vrazila-rosijskij-gelikopter-za-dopomogou-fpv-drona-dzerela/

[22] https://t.me/suspilnenews/36505

[23] https://t.me/rybar/62525

[24] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/08/06/nad-sumshhynoyu-zbyly-vorozhu-raketu-ta-gelikopter/ ; https://t.me/rybar/62503 ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/12435 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/48969; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/177799

[25] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2024

[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2024

[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060424 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2024

[28] https://suspilne dot media/808253-budanov-za-pivtora-dva-misaci-nastup-rosian-pide-na-spad/; https://forbes dot ua/war-in-ukraine/mobilizatsiya-v-ukraini-ta-rosii-nastupalniy-potentsial-voroga-ta-chi-boyatisya-ukraini-trampa-tezi-vistupu-golovi-gur-kirila-budanova-v-kse-06082024-22848

[29] https://isw.pub/UkrWar073024

[30] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate080122

[31] https://isw.pub/UkrWar073024

[32] https://euromaidanpress dot com/2024/08/07/more-than-95-of-ukrainian-prisoners-of-war-tortured-in-russia-un-mission/ ; https://www.ukrinform dot net/rubric-ato/3892952-over-95-of-ukrainian-pows-tortured-in-russia-un.html ; https://nos dot nl/nieuwsuur/artikel/2531435-vanavond-op-tv-martelingen-oekraiense-militairen-ophef-olympische-sporter-onrust-venezuela

[33] https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/geneva-convention-relative-treatment-prisoners-war

[34] https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0BTX9jSVTJ3zE8Fw8r4US9J3ULVgiU22ctP9pFYCJJb2X2nNSLFEhsxy2y64JwEjol&id=100095195483422 ; https://interfax.com dot ua/news/general/1005465.html

[35] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2024

[36] https://a.cec dot md/ro/cec-a-refuzat-inregistrarea-blocului-electoral-victorie-pobeda-2781_110576.html

[37] https://a.cec dot md/ro/cec-a-refuzat-inregistrarea-blocului-electoral-victorie-pobeda-2781_110576.html

[38] https://a.cec dot md/ro/cec-a-refuzat-inregistrarea-blocului-electoral-victorie-pobeda-2781_110576.html ; https://www.legis dot md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=92829&lang=ro

[39] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042124

[40] https://a.cec dot md/storage/ckfinder/files/Anexa_HCEC_1131_Instruc%C8%9Biune(1).pdf; https://a.cec dot md/ro/cec-a-refuzat-inregistrarea-blocului-electoral-victorie-pobeda-2781_110576.html

[41] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042124

[42] https://newsmaker dot md/ro/cec-refuza-sa-inregistreze-blocul-victorie-condus-de-sor-pentru-participarea-la-referendum-si-prezidentiale/

[43] https://t.me/tass_agency/264832

[44] https://meduza dot io/en/news/2023/08/31/blogger-andrey-kurshin-arrested-in-moscow-on-suspicion-of-spreading-fakes-about-russian-army; https://t.me/shot_shot/56395; https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/18630299; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-31-2023

[45] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-31-2023

[46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13494; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13481; https://t.me/wargonzo/21423; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13491

[47] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13491

[48] https://t.me/otukharkiv/668

[49] https://t.me/otukharkiv/660

[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028Q43Ct9XGBktb2CQFbRLAW5bRhMWpncvhsvH5NLrxhCttHgeHVGQNhsRYtfAmoa3l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0385GXL35DzKvXsW2K6jxBENdDGdyWEG8KJBTyGfbfDSbdW2iztiV9c491UqAYXeUbl

[51] https://t.me/otukharkiv/660

[52] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2098

[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028Q43Ct9XGBktb2CQFbRLAW5bRhMWpncvhsvH5NLrxhCttHgeHVGQNhsRYtfAmoa3l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0385GXL35DzKvXsW2K6jxBENdDGdyWEG8KJBTyGfbfDSbdW2iztiV9c491UqAYXeUbl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0295G34sjiPKwRbuJ9vafEvg5hpLCbTKSaqHiWkUsaxzy9rkktQSgPaW26eDPKJZ7Pl

[54] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6280; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/862

[55] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6279; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/862

[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028Q43Ct9XGBktb2CQFbRLAW5bRhMWpncvhsvH5NLrxhCttHgeHVGQNhsRYtfAmoa3l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0385GXL35DzKvXsW2K6jxBENdDGdyWEG8KJBTyGfbfDSbdW2iztiV9c491UqAYXeUbl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0295G34sjiPKwRbuJ9vafEvg5hpLCbTKSaqHiWkUsaxzy9rkktQSgPaW26eDPKJZ7Pl

[57] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6281; https://t.me/project_nd/143

[58] https://t.me/wargonzo/21423 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/16316 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028Q43Ct9XGBktb2CQFbRLAW5bRhMWpncvhsvH5NLrxhCttHgeHVGQNhsRYtfAmoa3l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0385GXL35DzKvXsW2K6jxBENdDGdyWEG8KJBTyGfbfDSbdW2iztiV9c491UqAYXeUbl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0295G34sjiPKwRbuJ9vafEvg5hpLCbTKSaqHiWkUsaxzy9rkktQSgPaW26eDPKJZ7Pl

[59] https://t.me/z_arhiv/27558 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21423 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74191 ; https://t.me/rybar/62504 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/264800

[60] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028Q43Ct9XGBktb2CQFbRLAW5bRhMWpncvhsvH5NLrxhCttHgeHVGQNhsRYtfAmoa3l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0385GXL35DzKvXsW2K6jxBENdDGdyWEG8KJBTyGfbfDSbdW2iztiV9c491UqAYXeUbl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0295G34sjiPKwRbuJ9vafEvg5hpLCbTKSaqHiWkUsaxzy9rkktQSgPaW26eDPKJZ7Pl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21438

[61] https://t.me/wargonzo/21438

[62] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13471 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74191 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13486

[63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028Q43Ct9XGBktb2CQFbRLAW5bRhMWpncvhsvH5NLrxhCttHgeHVGQNhsRYtfAmoa3l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0385GXL35DzKvXsW2K6jxBENdDGdyWEG8KJBTyGfbfDSbdW2iztiV9c491UqAYXeUbl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0295G34sjiPKwRbuJ9vafEvg5hpLCbTKSaqHiWkUsaxzy9rkktQSgPaW26eDPKJZ7Pl

[64] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/08/06/rosiyany-nakryvayutsya-rozkladenymy-tilamy-svoyih-tovaryshiv-shhob-vryatuvatysya-vid-nashyh-droniv/

[65] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6274; https://t.me/odshbr79/271

[66] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028Q43Ct9XGBktb2CQFbRLAW5bRhMWpncvhsvH5NLrxhCttHgeHVGQNhsRYtfAmoa3l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0385GXL35DzKvXsW2K6jxBENdDGdyWEG8KJBTyGfbfDSbdW2iztiV9c491UqAYXeUbl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0295G34sjiPKwRbuJ9vafEvg5hpLCbTKSaqHiWkUsaxzy9rkktQSgPaW26eDPKJZ7Pl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21423

[67] https://t.me/opbr_zsu/312 ; https://x.com/Spider18Actual/status/1821210372017418544

[68] https://t.me/voin_dv/10157; https://t.me/voin_dv/10158; https://t.me/voin_dv/10148

[69] https://t.me/wargonzo/21423

[70] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028Q43Ct9XGBktb2CQFbRLAW5bRhMWpncvhsvH5NLrxhCttHgeHVGQNhsRYtfAmoa3l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0385GXL35DzKvXsW2K6jxBENdDGdyWEG8KJBTyGfbfDSbdW2iztiV9c491UqAYXeUbl; 3McPbfHJtFm6J6TxDvNp2xVs4NpeBmMXzXRFLR1nKxruK6aBfeEwBPDcl; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/10856

[71] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/nalit-na-tendrivsku-kosu-rozvidnyky-znyshchyly-tekhniku-osobovyi-sklad-i-fortyfikatsii-okupantiv.html; https://t.me/DIUkraine/4227

[72] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/65035

[73] https://t.me/ComAFUA/376

[74] https://t.me/kyivoda/19201; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/08/07/vorog-tretyu-nich-pospil-atakuvav-kyyivshhynu-naslidky/

[75] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/08/07/na-sumshhyni-vnochi-zbyly-balistychnu-raketu/; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/28796

[76] https://t.me/tass_agency/264836

[77] https://t.me/tass_agency/264839

[78] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/21552331

[79] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11115

[80] https://t.me/tass_agency/264846; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/21548519

[81] https://t.me/tass_agency/264861; https://t.me/tass_agency/264871;

[82] https://www.belta dot by/society/view/belarus-i-iran-zainteresovany-razvivat-voennoe-sotrudnichestvo-652900-2024/ ; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/683188/ ; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/683185/

[83] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-9-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-and-iran-double-down-their-strategic-partnership; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2024